tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9987513.post2300947018277853957..comments2024-03-17T11:05:22.464+00:00Comments on The Life And Opinions of Andrew Rilstone: 10: 42Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9987513.post-18192216900528285792020-11-23T10:23:50.779+00:002020-11-23T10:23:50.779+00:00"I believe I am in love." Reason or Caus..."I believe I am in love." Reason or Cause?Aonghus Fallonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11414643238115071988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9987513.post-33326046171733003752020-11-21T19:33:58.389+00:002020-11-21T19:33:58.389+00:00I also, remain unconvinced by Lewis’ argument,
If...I also, remain unconvinced by Lewis’ argument,<br /><br />If the mind is a naturalistic entity, ultimately a product of naturalistic processes as we (more or less) understand them, then rational thought would be a product of those processes. Unlike Lewis’ examples the explanations in terms of causes and reasons would be complementary - different views of the same thing. Lewis examples are not that at all - he offers competing explanations on the same, mental level, which do not address this issue at all. (I recommend the discussion of reductionism and holism in Douglas Hofstadter’s <i>Gödel, Escher, Bach</i>).<br /><br />It therefore seems to me that Lewis does not even consider naturalistic explanations of the mind, let alone refute them.Paul Kingnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9987513.post-16546341587014678802020-11-20T18:23:12.149+00:002020-11-20T18:23:12.149+00:00In the paragraph that begins "Lewis overstate...In the paragraph that begins "Lewis overstates his case again", I think your less-overstated version still goes a bit too far. "He should have said that either we can know nothing, or else at least some of our thoughts have reasons and no causes." Not even that! Even if <i>all</i> our thoughts have causes <i>as well as</i> reasons, we can still know things. (At least in a reasonable sense of "know" that allows for a bit of fallibility; I personally am entirely comfortable saying that we don't know <i>anything</i> so securely that we should think it literally impossible that we're wrong.)<br /><br />Lewis is right that "a belief which can be accounted for entirely in terms of causes is worthless". But he jumps from that to saying that if there are any causes at work at all then all is lost, and that's not true even at the level of individual beliefs.<br /><br />Suppose something to do with testosterone biases men towards thinking that triangles have three sides. Then we unfortunate males will tend to be more charitable towards arguments leading to that conclusion. But that doesn't mean those arguments are wrong! If I show you a mathematically valid proof that triangles have three sides[1], it isn't made any less valid by the fact that you and I both want to believe it. (But that fact <i>does</i> mean that anyone else observing us should take our belief as weaker evidence than they otherwise would, until they've checked the argument for themselves; and if they too happen to be male, they should take their own approval of the argument as weaker evidence than they otherwise would.)<br /><br />We need to be <i>careful</i> in cases where our beliefs have causes as well as reasons. That's all.<br /><br />[1] Not that it's clear what that would mean. Triangles have three sides <i>by definition</i>.ghttps://www.mccaughan.org.uk/g/noreply@blogger.com