Thursday, March 26, 2026

What are we to make of all this?

There has been a belated but very interesting discussion between me and friend-of-the-blog Mike Taylor in the comments on the series of posts on Mark’s Gospel I published back in 2020.

Our disagreement concerns something I had rather taken for granted as the scholarly consensus: that “Mark” was a storyteller who compiled and shaped an oral tradition of Jesus stories into a literary work, and that “Matthew” and “Luke” used his text as a source. Mike takes a more traditional view, that all four Gospels depend on eyewitness testimony. They are not necessarily “infallible” or “inerrant”; but when Matthew alters Mark, he is doing so to make the narrative more consistent with how he personally remembered it, not to improve the story or bring it into line with his theological views.

I wrote:

“I think the point of disagreement here is that I am more or less convinced by the liberal scholarly consensus that the synoptic writers were primarily story tellers: working from an already existing collection of stories and assembling them and reworking them into the books we now call 'gospels'. They were less interested in reporting 'what actually happened' than in making sure the readers understood who Jesus was and why he was important. And where their understandings differ, they tell the stories differently.”

Mike responded by quoting the following passage in full.

“Another point is that on that view you would have to regard the accounts of the Man as being legends. Now, as a literary historian, I am perfectly convinced that whatever else the Gospels are they are not legends. I have read a great deal of legend and I am quite clear that they are not the same sort of thing. They are not artistic enough to be legends. From an imaginative point of view they are clumsy, they don’t work up to things properly. Most of the life of Jesus is totally unknown to us, as is the life of anyone else who lived at that time, and no people building up a legend would allow that to be so. Apart from bits of the Platonic dialogues, there are no conversations that I know of in ancient literature like the Fourth Gospel. There is nothing, even in modern literature, until about a hundred years ago when the realistic novel came into existence. In the story of the woman taken in adultery we are told Christ bent down and scribbled in the dust with His finger. Nothing comes of this. No one has ever based any doctrine on it. And the art of inventing little irrelevant details to make an imaginary scene more convincing is a purely modern art. Surely the only explanation of this passage is that the thing really happened? The author put it in simply because he had seen it.”

I am sure we can all identify this as coming from CS Lewis’s 1950 essay “What Are We To Make of Jesus Christ.”

*

“What Are We To Make of Jesus Christ?” can be found, alongside other examples of CS Lewis’s journalism, in a Walter Hooper anthology entitled God In The Dock, where it sits between a little sermon about judging others which first appeared in an Anglican periodical (“The Trouble With X”) and a learned debate with philosopher CEM Joad from a Jesuit journal. (“The Pains of Animals”).

But it was originally published in a book called Asking Them Questions. (The title refers to the story of the boy Jesus in the temple.)

It’s a rather charming idea: a Scottish clergyman named Ronald Selby Wright handed out slips of paper to the boys in his local youth club and invited them to write down any questions they could think of about Christianity. He was surprised (although he probably shouldn’t have been) that the boys came up with fairly deep, theological questions about Satan and the Trinity, where he had expected practical inquiries about faith and conduct. So he had the idea of sending the questions to bishops, philosophers and prominent Christians and making a book of the answers. The questions seem very much the sort of thing teenaged boys might ask. “Does the idea of original sin mean that even a wee baby is sinful?” “How can God be love? I always thought He was a person.” Wright comes across as slightly patronising. “A telegraph messenger asked ‘What was Christ’s position as God if he prayed to God’, an apprentice plumber about the Second Coming…” but he clearly means well.

So “What are we to make of Jesus Christ?” is a subject that Lewis had been asked to speak on, not one that he had chosen for himself—which explains why he begins by saying that it is a silly question! The essay is specifically directed at intelligent, but relatively uneducated teenagers. So it should be approached differently from, for example, "Fern Seed and Elephants" which makes some similar points but is addressed to candidates for ordination.

Lewis rose to national prominence as a result of his BBC radio broadcasts, and during the war he had a kind of ministry giving lectures about faith at RAF bases. Although he was not a theologian or a Bible scholar, he believed he had the knack of translating difficult religious ideas into the vernacular of ordinary people. It must be said that not all the contributors to Asking Them Questions have this skill. One Rev. AE Taylor, responding to a question about the childhood of Jesus (“He can’t have been much fun and if He were an ordinary Boy he must have sinned, mustn’t He?”) says that the idea that Jesus wouldn’t have experienced normal adolescent temptations “seems to me to be a relic of the Docetist heresy.”

If you are explaining quantum physics or natural selection to young people in five pages, you can’t be expected to give them a full understanding of what contemporary scientists actually believe. (Is it still the case that protons and neutrons whizz round an atomic nucleus like planets round the sun until year eleven?) But it is important to play fair. A poor analogy, or an analogy pressed too far could leave your students with the sense that scientists are not to be trusted.

*

CS Lewis’s essay appears in the third volume of Asking Them Questions which was published in 1950; as it happens, the same year as The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. The earlier Narnia books were exercises in defamiliarisation. Lewis wanted to tell a story that was like the story of the Passion and the Resurrection, so that children would be able to experience emotionally what the story meant. “Better felt than telt” as the Scots say.

I think “What Are We To Make of Jesus Christ” is doing something similar. Lewis presents Jesus to the teenagers as someone strange, alien, compelling, attractive, even frightening. He wants to get past the dusty formulas (“...and in His only Son, Jesus Christ, our Lord”) and uncover the surprising heart of the Christian message.

And he does that kind of thing better than anyone else. The purely evangelistic passages brilliantly tip-toe past the sleeping dragons of habitual piety.

“If you had gone to Socrates and asked, 'Are you Zeus?' he would have laughed at you. If you had gone to Mohammed and asked, 'Are you Allah?' he would first have rent his clothes and then cut your head off.”

The point is made with great power and wit (regardless of whether or not you agree with it.) Lewis pointedly refrains from quoting directly from the English Bible, preferring pithy paraphrases of his own. In the final paragraph of the essay, he puts a series of statements about Christ’s identity alongside each other: it’s among the best bits of religious writing he ever published:

“Others say, 'This is the truth about the Universe. This is the way you ought to go,' but He says, 'I am the Truth, and the Way, and the Life.' He says, 'No man can reach absolute reality, except through Me. Try to retain your own life and you will be inevitably ruined. Give yourself away and you will be saved.’…”

Is it just me, or does this paraphrase come out sounding something like the gnostic Jesus of the apocryphal Thomas gospel?

In one or two cases, Lewis could be accused of “pressing” the text. In Mark’s Gospel, the High Priest asks Jesus “Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed” to which Jesus replies “I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.” (Matthew and Luke make Jesus a smidgeon more equivocal: the former has “Thou has said” and the latter has “You say that I am.”) It is intrinsically unlikely that a Jewish high priest understood “son of the blessed” in any Christian theological sense: he must have been asking Jesus if he was the expected Jewish Messiah.

But Lewis has subtly reworked the passage:

“The moment at which the High Priest said to Him, 'Who are you?’ 'I am the Anointed, the Son of the uncreated God, and you shall see Me appearing at the end of all history as the judge of the Universe.”

Again, Jesus did not quite say “I am begotten of the One God, before Abraham was, I am”. This conflates something which John says that Jesus said (John 8:58) with something John says about him. [John 1 14&18, John 3 16&18.)  

I am also very slightly troubled that Lewis say unequivocally that Jesus “went around saying to people ‘I forgive you your sins’”. What he said, to the disabled man and to the woman with the flask of perfume was “Your sins are forgiven”.

But I think all this is forgivable overstatement. Lewis might well have said that he was attempting to create an oil painting rather than a photograph: something more like Holman Hunt’s Light of the World — or, indeed, like his own Aslan—than any historical reconstruction.

*

In so far as the essay is apologetic rather than evangelical, it is largely a restatement of our old friend the Trilemma. You remember how it goes: we know that Lucy doesn’t tell lies; we know that Lucy isn’t crazy; so logically there must really be a fairy tale kingdom hidden in Prof Kirke’s wardrobe. I think the death blow was struck to this argument by AN Wilson who wrote in his 1990 biography of Lewis that it can’t possibly be that simple. If it were, the world would be neatly divided into an overwhelming majority of Christians and a tiny minority of spiritual flat-earthers too wicked or stupid or obstinate to accept the obvious.

My position hasn’t really changed. As long as we are talking about “Jesus”, the character in the Gospels, then “he was a fine fellow who said some jolly good things that we should all take a lot of notice of” is simply off the table. There are ancient writings about Jesus other than the Biblical ones. They say that Jesus only appeared to be human (the “docetist” heresy that Rev Taylor was concerned about) or that he was temporarily possessed by a divine spirit or that he was the son of a totally different God. But no-one in the ancient world seems to have had the view that he was a good teacher and nothing more. 

In this essay, Lewis presents the argument in a rather more measured way than he did in Christianity. Nearly everyone agrees that Jesus's moral teaching is sensible and impressive; but his statements about himself are extreme and megalomaniacal ("next to whom Hitler was the most sane and modest of men"). So you have to chose between what Lewis called "the Christian hypothesis"--that Jesus was what he claimed to be--or else declare him to be a madman ("on a level with someone who thinks he is a poached egg") or an actual demon. 

But what if there were another option? What if Jesus never said any of those things? Lewis goes on to address this question. If you are a fan of alliteration, you might want to say that he is expanding the “lunatic, liar or Lord” trilemma into a quadrilemma: “lunatic, legend, liar or Lord”

*
And the scribes and Pharisees brought unto him a woman taken in adultery
and when they had set her in the midst they say unto him

"Master, this woman was taken in adultery, in the very act
Now Moses in the law commanded us, that such should be stoned
But what sayest thou?"
This they said, tempting him, that they might have to accuse him.

But Jesus stooped down, and with his finger wrote on the ground...
So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and said unto them
"He that is without sin among you
let him first cast a stone at her"
And again he stooped down, and wrote on the ground.
And they which heard it they went out one by one...
beginning at the eldest, even unto the last

And Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst.
When Jesus had lifted up himself
And saw none but the woman
he said unto her
"Woman, where are those thine accusers?
Hath no man condemned thee?"

She said,"No man, Lord."
And Jesus said unto her
"Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more"

John 8: 3-11

*

It is fairly ironic that Lewis should take the story of the woman taken in adultery as his demonstration that the New Testament stories must be historically accurate. The Good News Bible prints the story in [square brackets]. The New International Version prints it between two paragraph rules. The New English Bible puts it on a page by itself after the rest of John’s Gospel, labelled “An incident in the temple”.

This is because the oldest extant texts of John (from the second and third centuries) omit the story altogether. We don’t have it in a manuscript before the fifth century. And even then it is what folksingers would call a “floating” passage: it turns up in different places in different documents. Sometimes it is not in John’s Gospel at all, but in Luke’s, just after Jesus has finished preaching in the temple at the end of his public ministry. And sometimes it is placed at the end of John, or of Luke. As an appendix, of doubtful authenticity? Or as a story which sums up everything that has gone before? “Go and do not sin again” would be a good note to go out on. 

What happened? Did some scribes redact the passage because the implications were simply too shocking? Augustine thought that men deleted it because they thought it would encourage their wives to cheat on them. On the other hand, perhaps it was an oral tradition that eventually got incorporated into the canon because it is such a compelling story?

The fourth century historian Eusebius says that a late first century writer named Papias said that there was a story about Jesus pardoning an adulteress in a now-lost book called the Gospel of the Hebrews—which scholars think was probably a more Jewish version of Matthew.

It’s complicated.

*

I have the following problems with CS Lewis’s treatment of the material.


1: The text says “Jesus stooped down, and with his finger wrote on the ground….And again he stooped down, and wrote on the ground.”

I do not know Greek and rely on dictionaries and concordances for this sort of thing. But it seems that on the first occasion, the word for “wrote” is katagráfo; on the second it is simply grafo. Strong’s concordance tells me that in the ancient world katagrafo sometimes meant “to write down an accusation”; in modern Greek it seems to mean something like “registered”. Lewis chooses to say that Jesus “scribbled”. Talking about the same passage in the lecture to theology students, he goes with “doodled”. These are not necessarily wrong: I understand kata to be an intensifier, so a possible translation could be “he very wrote”. But Lewis has chosen words which fit his thesis.

In the lecture to ordinands, he says that the passage is an example of the New Testament’s use of “pictures”. I think this is very telling. Lewis has read the story very closely and mediated on it. He has used his imagination to envisage the scene, which is just what a devotional reader, as opposed to a scholar, might be expected to do. He has pictured a slightly embarrassed Jesus doodling to defuse the situation. And he has unconsciously projected that picture back onto the text itself.

Gen means "earth" or "land" or occasionally "soil". Some translations say that Jesus wrote in the dust or on the earth: but the majority go with on the ground.


2: Tom Jones was published in 1749. Pamela was published in 1736. Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders were written in 1722 and 1719. The Canterbury Tales was written around 1400, and is full of things like “Ful smale ypulled were hire browes two" and “This Nicholas was risen for to pisse". The idea that realistic fiction didn’t exist before 1850 is risible.


3: The preservation of a particular detail doesn’t tell us anything about whether a memory, an oral tradition, or a folk-tale is accurate in any other respect. Everyone knows that Queen Victoria was not amused; everyone knows that Alfred burned the cakes: hardly anyone remembers the particular narrative context that those snippets occurred in.

In my book on Mark, I used the example of my grandmother and the elephant. The incident was told to me as true; but if I told it to my grandchildren, it would take the form of a story: “One day, when Queen Victoria was still on the throne, my granny, who was about six years old at the time, heard a knock on the door. What do you think she saw when her mother opened it…?” The tale—or if you like, the meme— would contain a great deal of actual information: that there were travelling circuses in Cornwall at the turn of the twentieth century; that even well-to-do-houses in the country had pumps rather than running water; that a little girl knew what an elephant was even though she had never seen one. But was my granny six or ten or fourteen at the time of the incident? Did the house have a bell or a knocker or did the circus man call out politely that his elephant needed a drink? I have no idea.

I forget who it was who said that the only thing we can confidently say about the historical Jesus is that he used to begin sentences with “Verily, verily.” For all we know, “Jesus used to scribble in the dirt before he answered questions” was a well-known fact that the author of John happened to make use of.


4: “No-one has ever based any doctrine” on the incident. Well, it depends what you mean by doctrine. If you mean credal statement or dogma, then this is entirely correct: in fact, very little of the New Testament has given rise to doctrines in that sense. (“I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Holy Catholic church, the walking on the water, the writing in the dust, and the life everlasting”.) But if by “doctrine” you mean didache, teaching (“they were astonished at his doctrine") then yes, preachers and expositors have indeed derived teaching from the incident.

The two most common interpretations have been:

A: Jesus wrote down the specific sins of those present. This would fit well with the suggestion that  katagrapho means "write an accusation". It is pure speculation, but it is speculation which goes back to St Jerome.

B: “Thou shalt not commit adultery” is one of the Ten Commandments, and the Ten Commandments were written by the finger of God. (Exodus 31:18; Deuteronomy 9:10) So by writing on the ground with his finger Jesus is identifying himself with the Author of the law which has been broken. He is, in fact, telling the pharisees not to quote the deep magic to him, because he was there when it was written. And it could be taken to mean that the Torah is written in dust, not on stone: that it is a temporary thing that can be amended.

Which one do you believe? Your answer affects the wider meaning of the story. If you go with the first version, then Jesus is shaming these particular pharisees into letting this particular woman off,  but making no wider judgement on the use of the death penalty for victimless sex offences. He is saying no more than “Are you really going to kill this lady, considering what I heard about you and Lydia on Tuesday night?”

If you choose the second one, you are getting much closer to saying that the commandment against adultery no longer applies. Or at any rate, that there are no longer any secular or this-worldly punishments for breaking it. The Ten Commandments is more guidelines than rules.

The King James Bible, and practically no other English translation, says that the Pharisees left because they were “convicted by their consciences” which fits well with the first theory. But the majority of manuscripts don’t have that verse, and the majority of scholars think it is a scribal amendment. Did I mention that it was complicated?


5: But my really big problem is with Lewis's use of the word “legend”.

CS Lewis relatively often uses word-play in his essays, and there is nothing wrong with that. He begins “What Are We To Make of Jesus Christ?” by playing with the fact that you could take the question in two ways. In the passage in Grief Observed that I was talking about a few days ago, he rejects the idea of a cruel God on the grounds that a person who tormented kittens for the fun of it could not be imagined as the Creator. “He, make a universe? He couldn’t make a joke, or a bow, or an apology, or a friend”. Lewis’s point doesn’t depend on the ambiguity of the word “make”.

Suppose Jesus didn’t say the things that he is supposed to have said. Say, for example “His followers exaggerated the story, so the legend grew up that he had said them”. Well, in that case legends is what the Gospels would have to be. But from a literary standpoint, they are obviously not legends. And if they are not legends: they are reportage. (“Pretty close up to the facts; nearly as close as Boswell.”) Q.E.D

Lewis has rather skilfully palmed his cards: casually dropping the word “legend” into one sentence (“the legend grew up”) and then putting it in italics at the beginning of the next paragraph (“on that view you would have to regard they accounts of the Man as being legends.”) And of course, if “legend” is a literary genre, Lewis has a perfectly good point. The Gospels are not very much like Homer or Malory or even the rhymes of Robin Hood. But that wasn’t the point we agreed to: we only agreed that if they weren't literally factual then they might be stories with an historical basis that had drifted some distance from the original facts. In Bristol, we have a local legend about a man who for years collected parking fees for a car-park that didn’t exist; in Scotland, there are legends about lakes inhabited by sea monsters; any Liverpool tour guide might report a local legend about John and Paul drinking in a particular pub. Those stories don't have the artistry and completeness of an Arthurian myth, either. 

If some of the Gospel stories are not reportage, certainly they must be something else: folk-tales, or rumours, or gnostic myths, or attempts to answer the “WWJD?” question in narrative form. Lewis was aware of Bultman, who thought that the New Testament preserved no information about the historical Jesus. The Gospels were entirely about the struggles and conflicts in the communities that produced them. Heck, you can buy kitsch prints of Jesus playing little league baseball on eBay. They don't purport to be photojournalism; but they aren’t legends either. (Neither are they lies or frauds, though they may be in terrible taste.) 

It's an astonishing thing to say about historical literature: that artistically developed texts may be fictional, but clumsy and haphazard ones are probably true.

*

Eric Auerbach, who Lewis tells the theology students to read, talks of scriptural texts as having hermenuitic potential. They allow and invite preachers and thinkers and the pious to interpret them; to read things into them, to discover new meanings. I fear that an over-insistence on the literal, factual, journalistic accuracy of the texts risks emptying them of their meaning. 

I once heard an evangelical clergyman ask why we are told that the miraculous catch in the last chapter of John’s Gospel consisted of precisely one hundred and fifty three fish. 

“Because” he cried “It was the NUMBER THEY ACTUALLY CAUGHT!”

Well, okay: but why did John tell us that exact number—who, indeed, in the presence of  the risen Lord, bothered to count? And why pick out that particular fact, when there are other things in the story we would like to have known? (Are we to picture the resurrected Jesus walking along the shore collecting wood; or was the fire he was cooking on a miraculous creation?)

I have complained before about the kind of person who says that they love books, but who decries bad actors called “teachers” and “critics” who see literature as something more than a delivery-mechanism for vivid narratives.

You know the kind of thing:

What the Author wrote: "The curtains were blue.”

What the English Teacher thinks: "The blue curtains represent the character's immense depression and their lack of will to move forward….

What the Author actually meant: "The curtains were f***ing blue.”


To which my answer is always: yes, very probably they were. But why of all the thousands of things he could have said about the house, did the author choose to pick on the colour of the curtains?

Jesus was around thirty years old; we usually assume that his ministry lasted about three years. (Why we assume that I am not quite sure.) John’s Gospel runs to maybe twenty pages. Like the schoolboy in Rev Wright’s youth club; we would love to know more about his childhood, or what he was doing in Nazareth during the decades between his twelfth and thirtieth birthdays. We would love it if some Dead Sea Scroll dropped us a factual crumb. But they never do: the apocryphas and the folklore traditions always have a didactic purpose. Jesus is a figure filled with meaning, not as an individual with a shoe size and a favourite breakfast. Even something modern like Christ in the Carpenter’s Shop, which was thought scandalously realistic in its day, is almost comically over-stuffed with significance. 

If the story of the writing in the dust is reportage from which no-one has or should derive didache, should we say the same thing about the passage as a whole? “Here’s a funny thing: there was this one time when he shamed some Pharisees into letting off a woman who’d be caught cheating.” I think there are people who would actually say that this is the case. What you need to know s John 3:16 and Romans 10:9: the rest is background information and material for sermon illustration.

But the author of John’s Gospel says directly that he selected his material for a specific didactic purpose. 

"And many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book: But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name." [John 20 30-31]

I think you would be on shaky grounds if you said that he said the curtains were blue because blue happened to be the colour of the curtains.

*

What does the story mean? Jerome’s theory about Jesus writing the pharisees sins (and in fact King James' interpolation about their consciences) tames the passage. The woman gets off in this case because her accusers happen to be hypocrites. A writer named Enoch Powell remarked that this tends to reduce Jesus to the level of an indulgent schoolmaster. “Well, I ought to whack you, but it’s a lovely day and my horse just came in at Newmarket, so be off with you, but remember smoking is still against the rules.”

But the alternative is that it means what it says: that only the sinless can condemn sin; but the one actually sinless person chooses not to. (Note, incidentally, that he does not say “neither do I condemn you on condition you accept Jesus Christ as your personal saviour”.) If the seventh commandment has been rescinded where does that leave the sixth. Or the eighth?

William Blake wrote a long, fragmentary poem celebrating a revolutionary Christ that he had largely conjured out of his own copious imagination. (“The vision of Christ that thou dost see is my vision’s greatest enemy!”

He sees the story as being about the abolition of moral law.

Good and Evil are no more!
Sinai’s trumpets cease to roar!
Cease, finger of God, to write!
The Heavens are not clean in Thy sight.
Thou art good, and Thou alone;
Nor may the sinner cast one stone.
To be good only, is to be
A God or else a Pharisee.

Blake was, I fully admit, as nutty as a fruitcake. But he is responding to something actually present in the story. I am quite sure that Enoch Powell was wrong when he said that Jesus was being ironic. And about several other things as well.

*

A salesman has to really believe in his product. But we don't blame him too much for overhyping it: for saying that his portable electric grill is better than all the other portable electric grills on the market; and that owning such a device will make you healthier and happier than all the poor saps with an unbranded one. In 1940, when the survival of civilisation really was on the line, would we have blamed Winston Churchill if he sometimes went beyond the strict limits of factual accuracy in his speechmaking?

Right at the end of his life, CS Lewis was interviewed by a representative of the Billy Graham missionary organisation.

“Would you say that the aim of Christian writing, including your own writing, is to bring about an encounter of the reader with Jesus Christ?” he was asked.

“That is not my language” replied Lewis “Yet it is the purpose I have in view.”

If that was what he thought he was doing, I think we can forgive him if there were a few loose links in the chain of logic along the way.

*

A religious joke

So, Jesus looks at them and says “Let he who is without sin cast the first stone.”

And from the crowd comes a large rock, which strikes the woman squarely on the head.

Jesus sighs. “You just couldn’t stop yourself, Mother” he says.

Tuesday, March 24, 2026

The Vivisectionist, the Pacifist, and the Humanitarian

That concludes the first section of my critique of CS Lewis's Abolition of Man, currently a work in progress. 

The second section, which considers a parallel argument about justice and punishment, and various matters arising, is currently available to supporters of my Patreon. If you aren't able to commit to $5 a month, the individual chapters can be purchased for $3 and the complete collection for $20. (You can pay in pounds sterling or flanian pobblebeads, of course.

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I: Desert

2: Restraint

3: Reform 

4: Vengeance

5: Atonement

6: Hell

7: Anarchy

8: Armageddon

9: Epilogue



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Chapter 6: The Importance of Having Bathrooms [continued]

 Lewis’s Approvals

1: “Those who prefer the arts of peace to the arts of war” (it is not said in what circumstances) are such that “we may want to call them wise men”

We’re back with the Utopians. We’ve decided that just calling someone a coward, without pointing out something cowardly they have actually done, is pointless. King and Ketley go on: 

To call the Utopians cowards has told us nothing about them. The “proud northern race” may call them cowards because the Utopians prefer the arts of peace to the arts of war; when we know this, we may want to call them wise men. [Control of Language p65]

King and Ketley are not necessarily saying that peace is to be preferred to war even in the face of Genghis Kahn and Mr Hitler. They have specifically said that we can’t judge a man a coward until we know what he has done, and under what circumstances he has done it. They are quite clearly saying that the same person might be considered a coward or a peacemaker depending on the speaker’s point of view. It might be that the propagandist is calling the Utopians cowards because he saw their soldiers running away from a much weaker opponent; or because he saw them beating up small children and kicking puppy-dogs. But it might equally be that he is calling them cowards because they have sent a wise ambassador to broker an amicable compromise before sending in the army. It might be that they despise farmers and woodcutters on general principles. It might be that they have heard that some Utopians live long enough to die of old age. Without further information, we don’t know. On no possible view are King and Ketley arguing that peace is preferable to war under all circumstances. 

2: The pupil is expected “to believe in a democratic community life”.

CS Lewis frequently asked the question: is democratic behaviour the behaviour that democrats like or the behaviour that will preserve democracy? Screwtape distinguishes between the referential meaning of the word “democracy”—a pretty good system that some countries have adopted for selecting leaders—and the emotive (Screwtape says “invocatory”) use of the word—the false belief that everyone is as good as everyone else, particularly put forward by those who think themselves inferior. 

Lewis thought that democracy was a contingent good—a way of stopping a very bad person getting into power—as opposed to an absolute good in itself. He was a democrat because he thought that humans were so sinful that no individual one ought to be in charge; not because humans are so wonderful that they all deserve a share of running things. He himself may have hankered for a kind of prelapsarian aristocracy in the way Tolkien fantasised about a kind of pastoral anarchy. 

His accusation here, is, I think, that King and Ketley are elevating a local, contingent good into an absolute good. One of Lewis’ central ideas is that you can’t substitute secondary or partial goods for primary or total ones. It’s okay to like a drink, but if you like nothing apart from drink you’ll ruin your liver and also stop enjoying the taste of whisky. There is nothing wrong with preferring hosiery made of artificial fibres to the kind made of cotton; but there is a great deal wrong with desiring them more than you desire fellowship with Aslan. 

King and Ketley are inviting their students to think about how much propaganda is desirable in a democracy. 

To answer this we should ask ourselves other questions: if we believe in a democratic community life, and in freedom to choose for ourselves what is best for ourselves, when is it right for a writer to try to persuade us to believe in or disbelieve in, to like or dislike, what we cannot clearly understand? [p65]

There seems to be literally nothing to object to in this. Is emotional propaganda—which manipulates rather than persuades the listener—justifiable even if it promotes democratic community life? Which is a perfectly good question. 

3: “Contact with the ideas of other people is, as we know, healthy.”

We are back with the Proud Northern Tribe and the pesky Utopians. There is now going to be a referendum about whether or not the PNT should go to war. 

The Utopians, it is true, want peace. But, if we go to war, it will not be in any wanton spirit of self-aggrandisement. We shall be fighting a war of defence, to preserve our homes from the pernicious, if peaceful, penetration of alien ideas. We shall be fighting to prevent the destruction of our nation through the circulation of Utopian heresies. [p85]

King and Ketley suggest that students translate the passage into cold scientific prose, much as they did with Keats’s poem: when shorn of its emotive content, we can see the vacuity of the argument, and would likely reject it: 

If we go to war it will not be because we want to destroy another country, but because we want to keep out of this country the ideas of other peoples, ideas which may not agree with those held in this country.

This is very much what Dr Ransom does to Prof. Weston in Lewis’s science fiction story Out of the Silent Planet: render his propaganda into plain English to reveal that it is literal nonsense. (Lewis wished that Vicars had more practice translating erudite theological ideas into common speech: he regarded his own apologetic works primarily as translations.) 

King and Ketley go on: 

Understanding the real issue with the help of this scientific prose, the intelligent reader would probably decide that war would be absurd, because contact with the ideas of other people and other nations whether acceptable or not, is, as we know, healthy for the individual and the community.

“As we know”. Lewis is right that King and Ketley take for granted the idea that contact with other cultures is a Good Thing; and wanting to stop foreign ideas coming into your country is a Bad Thing. Not everyone would necessarily agree with this. “Multiculturalism is good” is a widely held point of view, but it is not strictly speaking a thing which can be known. We might think it a good thing that there are curry houses and pizza parlous in Leeds, but not such a good thing if a Western missionary started interfering with the culture of a previously undiscovered tribe in New Guinea.

I think Lewis may also be worried about the use of the word “healthy”. Talking to foreigners doesn’t literally improve your physical well-being, and society isn’t an organism and can’t be literally well or sick. And it is circular to say, even by analogy, that it is healthy to know about other ways of doing things, if your definition of health is “a state of affairs where you know about other ways of doing things”. There is some truth to the thought that King and Ketley have replaced “this is good” with “this is good for you”.

4: The reason for bathrooms ("that people are healthier and pleasanter to meet when they are clean") is "too obvious to need mentioning". 

King and Ketley raise the subject of bathrooms in a footnote. They are actually talking about what they call “scientific prose criticism”. They admit that it is hard to dispassionately review a play or a movie according to some objective criteria. You need to know quite a bit about movies and theatre to pull it off. But they think it is worth the effort. If two people have seen the same film and one says “it was simply marvellous,” and the other says “it was simply rotten” then there is nowhere else for the conversation to go. So it is better to be able to discuss the film, not in terms of your feelings, but in terms of “your two standards of good and bad and how they agree together”.

There follows a footnote: 

We feel we have a right to judge things and people “by results.” This judging by results is really scientific prose criticism, in which the reason for the judgment is omitted because it is too obvious to need mentioning. Thus we should judge an architect to be bad, if he omitted to build a bathroom in a new house. Our reason for making this judgment would be that, because people are healthier and pleasanter to meet when they are clean rather than dirty, bathrooms should always be built into new houses. But this reason is too obvious to need mentioning, and so it is omitted. [p142]

Which is, I concede, a really weird analogy. I suppose the point is that a critic doesn’t need to say “I prefer plays where the main actor has learned his lines and where the scenery doesn’t collapse half way through”. He could simply say that the unrehearsed theatrical disaster is bad and still be writing “scientific” criticism. By the same token, if an architect forgot that a house needs to have a toilet, you wouldn’t pay any attention to any other merits his building might have, and would simply call him a bad architect. But it is certainly an odd example for them to have picked. 

In 1943, many people in England still used outside loos and washed in metal baths in front of the kitchen fireplace. And I imagine that this was even more commonplace in Australia and in Ireland when Lewis was growing up. The British government was offering home improvement subsidies to people without bathrooms as late as the 1970s; and comedians of the era were still making jokes about the outside lavatories of their childhood. (And also about the use of repurposed newspapers for toilet paper.) And what does and doesn’t count as “clean” varies across different times and different places: in 21st century England, most people take a shower at least once a day, where Queen Elizabeth I famously took a bath once a month whether she needed it or not. So I suppose that Lewis’s point is that King and Ketley are treating a fairly modern and fairly luxurious innovation as a universal fact; and regarding present-day norms about sweaty smells as a self-evident principle. Perhaps he is also concerned that King and Ketley use “healthy” to mean both “what you are if you learn about other people’s ideas” and “what you are if you take a daily bath”. Cleanliness is a substitute for godliness.

*

In medieval times, there would have been no contradiction in calling someone “a good man and a villain” or “a nice chap and a bastard”: you’d simply have been saying that the one was a morally upright fellow who happened to live in a village, and the other was a likeable chap who’s parents happened not to be married. We could say that words like “villain” and “bastard” used to have referential meaning but are now used primarily for their emotive sense; we might say that they were at one time denotive and are now primarily connotative. CS Lewis, in an essay entitled the Death of Words, says that they are terms of description which have become terms of abuse. They are “words which once had a definable sense and are now mere noises of approval”. He is concerned that the word “Christian” is increasingly used in what he calls a “eulogistic” sense—as a compliment. He wants to use “Christian” to mean “someone who assents to a specific, knowable set of doctrinal beliefs”: other people want to use it to mean “someone who lives up to a particular moral precepts”. “That’s a Christian act” or “He is a good Christian” could end up only meaning that the person or the act was good, or that the speaker approves of them. By the end of the essay, Lewis seems to have gone full Sapir-Whorf. If the word Christian loses its meaning, the concept will be in danger of being “blotted from the human mind….Men do not long continue to think what they have forgotten how to say.”  

To prove his point, he gives an example of another word which used to have a clear referential meaning and is now only a useless dylogism. 

He makes the same point in the introduction to the 1950 edition of Mere Christianity (which brought together a series of previously published religious booklets, themselves based on radio lectures). He says that some people have complained about his proscriptive use of the word “Christian” on the radio show. He says that people have asked him "May not many a man who cannot believe these doctrines be far more truly a Christian, far closer to the spirit of Christ, than some who do?" He agrees that this is so, but says that using “Christian” to mean “someone close to the spirit of Jesus” renders a perfectly good word hors de combat. 

“In calling anyone a Christian they will mean that they think him a good man. But that way of using the word will be no enrichment of the language, for we already have the word good. Meanwhile, the word Christian will have been spoiled for any really useful purpose it might have served.” [Mere Christianity, preface.]

And he gives an example of another word which used to have a specific denotative meaning and is now simply a term of approval. 

He makes the same point yet again in his much more academic Studies in Words. Words, he says, can acquire a sort of “halo”: they start out referring to something specific and identifiable; they start to be used mainly to express approval (or disapproval) but with the original meaning still implicit. But eventually, only the emotional meaning is left. “The whole word is haloed, and finally there is nothing but halo. The word is then, for all accurate uses, dead.” [p282]

And he gives an example of a word that has been killed off in this way. It’s the same example he gave in the Verbicide essay, and again in Mere Christianity. 

That word is, of course, “gentleman”. 

In its original sense, it referred to someone who was gentil; that is, noble. A gentleman had land and a coat of arms and various other feudal technicalities. (I can’t be the only person who used to think that “When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?” was about gender: it’s actually about class. In the garden of Eden, everyone worked for a living and there were no nobles.) But it gradually came to mean “a person who behaves in the way in which a gentleman is supposed to behave” and eventually “any person we approve of”:

They meant well. To be honourable and courteous and brave is of course a far better thing than to have a coat of arms. But it is not the same thing. Worse still, it is not a thing everyone will agree about. To call a man "a gentleman" in this new, refined sense, becomes, in fact, not a way of giving information about him, but a way of praising him: to deny that he is "a gentleman" becomes simply a way of insulting him.

But isn’t this precisely the point that King and Ketley made when they said that  “the reference of the word gentleman is very vague”?  And didn’t Lewis blame them for having a narrow, provincial view of morality? When Lewis says that “gentleman” is now a useless word, is he debunking the whole idea of honesty and good manners and refraining from playing the banjo? Or is he simply making a point about language? 

The essay on verbicide, the introduction to Mere Christianity, and Studies in Words are all published after the Abolition of Man: after Lewis has studied the Control of Language. It is tempting to consider the possibility that the book unconsciously influenced his thinking. 

When a word ceases to be a term of description and becomes merely a term of praise, it no longer tells you facts about the object: it only tells you about the speaker’s attitude to that object. (A "nice" meal only means a meal the speaker likes.) 

When I called John a gentleman, I appeared to be saying something very important about something: but in fact I was only saying something about my own feelings. 

[END OF BOOK 1]  

That concludes the first section of my critique of CS Lewis's Abolition of Man, currently a work in progress. 

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Sunday, March 22, 2026

Chapter 6: The Importance of Having Bathrooms.

A smug atheist—let’s call him “Richard”—once wrote an article in a newspaper arguing that materialism was a more positive outlook than religion. If there is no afterlife, he said, then you are motivated to make the best possible use of the time you are given on this earth. 

The next day, a letter from an equally smug Christian appeared in the newspaper. “Given by whom?” it asked. 

The smug Christian had, arguably, caught the smug atheist in a contradiction. And various conclusions could have been drawn. “People sometimes say things they don’t really mean” would have been one. “It is impossible to talk about big questions without drifting into theological language” would have been another. 

But I don’t think we could draw the conclusion that the atheist had shown his true colours—revealed what he really meant, or what he really believed.  Not, at any rate, without checking it against the rest of his work. If the smug Christian had gone through Richard’s published writings and found that over and over again he talked as if there was one all-powerful Force controlling everything—well, that would be Quite Interesting. But if, having read his book and found that he consistently talked about evolution and physics as if they were blind, impersonal physical processes, it would be fair to assume that that was what he believed. If the smug Christian continued to say “But, of course, we know he really believes in the Force, because he said so” we wouldn’t think he was playing entirely fair. 

Throughout the Control of Language, King and Ketley take it for granted that some things are good and some things are bad. But Lewis doesn’t take this as evidence against his thesis that they believe that value-judgements are subjective and unimportant. He simply accuses them of inconsistency. It demonstrates, he says, that they are “better than their principles”

In an extended footnote [Abolition of Man, page 16] Lewis lists four things King and Ketley seem to approve of, and four things they seem to disapprove of. This, he says, demonstrates:

1: That they do, in fact have values. 

2: That these values are the consensus values of those around them.

3: That the consensus values of those around them are contemptible values—at any rate, debased and partial values. (This is, I suppose the “and by the way I personally think those values are false” part of the argument.) 

If you have damning evidence against the man in the dock, you don’t tell the jury that he is certainly, definitely, one hundred per cent guilty—and that even if he isn’t, it doesn’t matter, because he is bound to be guilty of something very nearly as bad. I think that Lewis knows that his case is a little weak. Otherwise he would not resort to saying, in effect “King and Ketley do not believe in moral values—and even if they do, the moral values they believe in are the wrong ones.”

Lewis’s complaint is that his adversaries see “comfort and security as the ultimate values” but that “those things which alone can preserve or spiritualise comfort and security are mocked.” But I am afraid that, in each case, Lewis has misunderstood or misrepresented what they actually say.  

Lewis’s List of Disapprovals 

1: “A mother’s appeal to a child to be brave is ‘nonsense’.”

King and Ketley are talking about propaganda, which they think is a kind of super advertising that utilises stock emotional responses to manipulate the listener. They acknowledge that appeals to emotion may sometimes be useful or necessary: parents often use them to socialise children. But propaganda is on the whole a bad thing precisely because it infantilises adults. 

Lewis uses “dulce et decorum est…” as an example of moral belief that civilised people take to be a deep truth even though it could be debunked at a literal level. (Dying isn’t a kind of food and therefore can’t taste sweet, and death in battle is unlikely to be sweet even by analogy.) So until I tracked down a copy of Control of Language, I assumed that “a mother’s appeal to a child to be brave” was referencing a Roman parent sending her son off to fight for the Empire. In fact, it refers to a contemporary mum trying to persuade a toddler to take some medicine. 

When a mother wants to get her child to swallow unpleasant medicine, she pours this artificially constructed emotive prose into his ears: “Be Mother’s brave little darling, now,” and so on. This sort of nonsense is often successful, and is a kind of propaganda. [Control of Language p62]

Some of the sounds which adults make to children are literally nonsensical (“Upsy daisy mummy’s ickle diddle diddums” etc etc.) In fact, King and Ketley’s example contains a fair amount of meaningful content: 

  • It is right for a child to seek its mother’s approval 

  • You know that your mother approves of courage 

  • Bigger children with more privileges have courage 

  • It will take courage to swallow this pill 

  • Therefore you ought to put up with the unpleasant taste because it’s what an older child would do, and because it will make your mother proud of you

But it is certainly true that the mother is not giving her real reason for wanting her child to take the medicine. She could perfectly well have done so: “This will taste horrid for a few seconds, but afterwards your hurty tummy will go away.” But she chose to appeal to emotion instead. The analogy with propaganda is perfectly clear. On no possible view are King and Ketley saying that the concept of  courage itself is nonsensical. 

2: “The reference of the word gentleman is extremely vague”

This follows directly from the previous passage. The parent has used “propaganda” to make the child take the pill, and at school, the child will be subjected to similar “propaganda”. Stock responses to emotive words will be employed to make him do particular things, without giving him any rational grounds for thinking that they are the right things to do. 

In school the child will be given, mostly in speech, a good many of these vaguely important words, whose reference is not clearly defined; the word “gentleman,” for instance. The word is supposed to rouse feelings of strong approval in such a sentence as: “That is not the action of a gentleman” though the reference is extremely vague. [p62] 

Recall that the reference of “Sir Francis Drake” is “a man in a ruff and a boat who sets fire to Spaniard’s beards” but that the emotive meaning of his name is “freedom and heroism and patriotism”. In the same sense the emotional meaning of “gentleman” is “a person we strongly approve of ", but the reference is—what? A posh chap, as opposed to a working class oik? An immaculately turned out fellow in a pinstripe suit and a monocle? I rather think that if the word is in use at all nowadays, except as a polite euphemism for a men’s public lavatory, it has the connotation of good manners: a gentleman doesn’t cheat at cards, he holds the door open for ladies, and remembers to tip the waiter. King and Ketley are quite correct to say that “Don’t do this because it isn’t what a gentleman would do” says nothing more than “Don’t do this because it isn’t the kind of thing we approve of.” On no view are they saying that honour, good manners, politeness—or even social class—are meaningless or without value. 

3: “To call a man a coward really tells us nothing about what he does.” 

Lewis’s next example comes from King and Ketley’s critique of a ludicrous piece of war-time propaganda that they have invented in order to show how ludicrous it is. It advocates war against a fictional nation called the Utopians: 

The Utopians are a contemptible race of low, cunning people—the dregs of the earth. Vicious, degraded, cowardly, lovers only of themselves and their invariably ill-gotten gold, they are unfit, and will ever be unfit, to mix with the proud splendour of our northern people... [p64]

Lewis seems to think that King and Ketley are skeptical about the virtue of courage—he has, after all, just falsely claimed that they think that injunctions to be brave in general are nonsensical. But their allegation is merely that the term coward, like the term gentleman is an emotive term of approval that hasn’t said anything specific. 

To call a man an architect tells us something clear about what he does—he designs and supervises buildings; but to call a man a coward tells us really nothing about what he does. We use the word as a word of disapproval, not as a descriptive term. Before we know whether to call a man a coward, we must find out how he has acted and in what circumstances—and this the word does not tell us. [p64]

If the passage had given us an example of the Utopians' actual behaviour, King and Ketley might well have thought that “coward” was an appropriate description. On no possible view are they saying that no-one is a coward, or that cowardice is not under some circumstances reprehensible. 

4: “Feelings about a country or an empire are feelings about nothing in particular.”

This time, King and Ketley’s target is a sentimental piece of writing that calls for Australians to show unswerving love for England. 

The relation between England and the Dominions should naturally be the relation between a mother and her children. England is our Mother Country; and we should give her, for her ever-constant, protective love, the respect and affection which is her due. The sacred bond which binds all human families together, for their health and mutual wisdom, should bind our family of nations together… [p76]

 Although Lewis doesn’t pick up on this, they do here take the passage to task for being literally untrue: they note that “England is actually not a mother, and the dominions are not her children”. But they are attacking the validity of the comparison, not making a point against metaphor in general. The patriotic screed appears to say “It is right that children love their mothers, therefore, it is right that Australians should love England”—but since the passage hasn’t established in what way England is mother-like, the metaphor doesn’t go anywhere. The accusation is the same as the one Thompson directed at the travel agent: the piece is trying to play the audience like a keyboard, clicking certain words and getting certain reactions in return: 

The writer seeks to rouse certain feelings about the Empire, but what that Empire is, what actually are the relations between the Dominions (and colonies) and England, are so vaguely defined or hinted at, that we have nothing real to attach our feelings to. [p78]

Hence

It rouses feeling about nothing in particular; and that is always an insult to the intelligence.

Nothing in particular. They used exactly the same words when they were talking about the silly letter to the newspaper: it wasn’t a complaint about anything in particular. They rewrote it, adding specific details—the new movie house would be noisy, didn’t fit in with the local architecture, would cause traffic congestion, and so on. And they used the same words again with regard to the newspaper report of the riot: the journalist didn’t appear to have noticed anything in particular. They contrasted that with the good war reporter who painted a vivid picture of who specifically was doing what specifically to whom specifically and where specifically they were doing it. 

This time, they suggest that imagining England as a father rather than a mother might be more apt; and use the analogy to refer to actual, concrete reasons why Australia might want to seek independence just yet:

Moreover, most of the children, as yet, do not earn enough to keep a sufficiently large body-guard of servants to protect themselves, so that Father feels it necessary to protect them, in return for promises of good behaviour and tokens of practical affection; and this again is a family bond. [p79]

The claim is that the bad piece of patriotic writing is so generalised that the emotions it evokes refer to “nothing in particular”.  The omission of the emphasis changes the meaning of the text. On no possible view are they saying that patriotism in general is without meaning. 

Unless, unless… Does Lewis think that Australians really should love England with the unquestioning love that a child feels for Mummy, and that to criticise patriotic writing necessarily implies the denial of that objective truth?

[continues]

This is the first section of an ongoing critique of C.S Lewis's book The Abolition of Man. (I think that my essays should make sense if you aren't familiar with that tome.) This first section (which runs to six chapters) has already been published in full on my Patreon page, and the second section is being serialised there at present. 

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