Wednesday, April 01, 2026
Shape of the Daleks
Thursday, March 26, 2026
What are we to make of all this?
and when they had set her in the midst they say unto him
"Master, this woman was taken in adultery, in the very act
Now Moses in the law commanded us, that such should be stoned
But what sayest thou?"
This they said, tempting him, that they might have to accuse him.
But Jesus stooped down, and with his finger wrote on the ground...
So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and said unto them
"He that is without sin among you
And again he stooped down, and wrote on the ground.
And they which heard it they went out one by one...
beginning at the eldest, even unto the last
And Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst.
When Jesus had lifted up himself
And saw none but the woman
he said unto her
"Woman, where are those thine accusers?
Hath no man condemned thee?"
She said,"No man, Lord."
And Jesus said unto her
"Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more"
*
Eric Auerbach, who Lewis tells the theology students to read, talks of scriptural texts as having hermenuitic potential. They allow and invite preachers and thinkers and the pious to interpret them; to read things into them, to discover new meanings. I fear that an over-insistence on the literal, factual, journalistic accuracy of the texts risks emptying them of their meaning.
I have complained before about the kind of person who says that they love books, but who decries bad actors called “teachers” and “critics” who see literature as something more than a delivery-mechanism for vivid narratives.
Tuesday, March 24, 2026
The Vivisectionist, the Pacifist, and the Humanitarian
I recently turned 60 (yes, really) and have mutated from a librarian who writes into a more or less full time writer, so if you have been considering lending your support to my writing, now would be a really, really, really lovely time for you to do so.
2: Restraint
3: Reform
4: Vengeance
5: Atonement
6: Hell
7: Anarchy
8: Armageddon
9: Epilogue
Chapter 6: The Importance of Having Bathrooms [continued]
Lewis’s Approvals
1: “Those who prefer the arts of peace to the arts of war” (it is not said in what circumstances) are such that “we may want to call them wise men”
We’re back with the Utopians. We’ve decided that just calling someone a coward, without pointing out something cowardly they have actually done, is pointless. King and Ketley go on:
To call the Utopians cowards has told us nothing about them. The “proud northern race” may call them cowards because the Utopians prefer the arts of peace to the arts of war; when we know this, we may want to call them wise men. [Control of Language p65]
King and Ketley are not necessarily saying that peace is to be preferred to war even in the face of Genghis Kahn and Mr Hitler. They have specifically said that we can’t judge a man a coward until we know what he has done, and under what circumstances he has done it. They are quite clearly saying that the same person might be considered a coward or a peacemaker depending on the speaker’s point of view. It might be that the propagandist is calling the Utopians cowards because he saw their soldiers running away from a much weaker opponent; or because he saw them beating up small children and kicking puppy-dogs. But it might equally be that he is calling them cowards because they have sent a wise ambassador to broker an amicable compromise before sending in the army. It might be that they despise farmers and woodcutters on general principles. It might be that they have heard that some Utopians live long enough to die of old age. Without further information, we don’t know. On no possible view are King and Ketley arguing that peace is preferable to war under all circumstances.
2: The pupil is expected “to believe in a democratic community life”.
CS Lewis frequently asked the question: is democratic behaviour the behaviour that democrats like or the behaviour that will preserve democracy? Screwtape distinguishes between the referential meaning of the word “democracy”—a pretty good system that some countries have adopted for selecting leaders—and the emotive (Screwtape says “invocatory”) use of the word—the false belief that everyone is as good as everyone else, particularly put forward by those who think themselves inferior.
Lewis thought that democracy was a contingent good—a way of stopping a very bad person getting into power—as opposed to an absolute good in itself. He was a democrat because he thought that humans were so sinful that no individual one ought to be in charge; not because humans are so wonderful that they all deserve a share of running things. He himself may have hankered for a kind of prelapsarian aristocracy in the way Tolkien fantasised about a kind of pastoral anarchy.
His accusation here, is, I think, that King and Ketley are elevating a local, contingent good into an absolute good. One of Lewis’ central ideas is that you can’t substitute secondary or partial goods for primary or total ones. It’s okay to like a drink, but if you like nothing apart from drink you’ll ruin your liver and also stop enjoying the taste of whisky. There is nothing wrong with preferring hosiery made of artificial fibres to the kind made of cotton; but there is a great deal wrong with desiring them more than you desire fellowship with Aslan.
King and Ketley are inviting their students to think about how much propaganda is desirable in a democracy.
To answer this we should ask ourselves other questions: if we believe in a democratic community life, and in freedom to choose for ourselves what is best for ourselves, when is it right for a writer to try to persuade us to believe in or disbelieve in, to like or dislike, what we cannot clearly understand? [p65]
There seems to be literally nothing to object to in this. Is emotional propaganda—which manipulates rather than persuades the listener—justifiable even if it promotes democratic community life? Which is a perfectly good question.
3: “Contact with the ideas of other people is, as we know, healthy.”
We are back with the Proud Northern Tribe and the pesky Utopians. There is now going to be a referendum about whether or not the PNT should go to war.
The Utopians, it is true, want peace. But, if we go to war, it will not be in any wanton spirit of self-aggrandisement. We shall be fighting a war of defence, to preserve our homes from the pernicious, if peaceful, penetration of alien ideas. We shall be fighting to prevent the destruction of our nation through the circulation of Utopian heresies. [p85]
King and Ketley suggest that students translate the passage into cold scientific prose, much as they did with Keats’s poem: when shorn of its emotive content, we can see the vacuity of the argument, and would likely reject it:
If we go to war it will not be because we want to destroy another country, but because we want to keep out of this country the ideas of other peoples, ideas which may not agree with those held in this country.
This is very much what Dr Ransom does to Prof. Weston in Lewis’s science fiction story Out of the Silent Planet: render his propaganda into plain English to reveal that it is literal nonsense. (Lewis wished that Vicars had more practice translating erudite theological ideas into common speech: he regarded his own apologetic works primarily as translations.)
King and Ketley go on:
Understanding the real issue with the help of this scientific prose, the intelligent reader would probably decide that war would be absurd, because contact with the ideas of other people and other nations whether acceptable or not, is, as we know, healthy for the individual and the community.
“As we know”. Lewis is right that King and Ketley take for granted the idea that contact with other cultures is a Good Thing; and wanting to stop foreign ideas coming into your country is a Bad Thing. Not everyone would necessarily agree with this. “Multiculturalism is good” is a widely held point of view, but it is not strictly speaking a thing which can be known. We might think it a good thing that there are curry houses and pizza parlous in Leeds, but not such a good thing if a Western missionary started interfering with the culture of a previously undiscovered tribe in New Guinea.
I think Lewis may also be worried about the use of the word “healthy”. Talking to foreigners doesn’t literally improve your physical well-being, and society isn’t an organism and can’t be literally well or sick. And it is circular to say, even by analogy, that it is healthy to know about other ways of doing things, if your definition of health is “a state of affairs where you know about other ways of doing things”. There is some truth to the thought that King and Ketley have replaced “this is good” with “this is good for you”.
4: The reason for bathrooms ("that people are healthier and pleasanter to meet when they are clean") is "too obvious to need mentioning".
King and Ketley raise the subject of bathrooms in a footnote. They are actually talking about what they call “scientific prose criticism”. They admit that it is hard to dispassionately review a play or a movie according to some objective criteria. You need to know quite a bit about movies and theatre to pull it off. But they think it is worth the effort. If two people have seen the same film and one says “it was simply marvellous,” and the other says “it was simply rotten” then there is nowhere else for the conversation to go. So it is better to be able to discuss the film, not in terms of your feelings, but in terms of “your two standards of good and bad and how they agree together”.
There follows a footnote:
We feel we have a right to judge things and people “by results.” This judging by results is really scientific prose criticism, in which the reason for the judgment is omitted because it is too obvious to need mentioning. Thus we should judge an architect to be bad, if he omitted to build a bathroom in a new house. Our reason for making this judgment would be that, because people are healthier and pleasanter to meet when they are clean rather than dirty, bathrooms should always be built into new houses. But this reason is too obvious to need mentioning, and so it is omitted. [p142]
Which is, I concede, a really weird analogy. I suppose the point is that a critic doesn’t need to say “I prefer plays where the main actor has learned his lines and where the scenery doesn’t collapse half way through”. He could simply say that the unrehearsed theatrical disaster is bad and still be writing “scientific” criticism. By the same token, if an architect forgot that a house needs to have a toilet, you wouldn’t pay any attention to any other merits his building might have, and would simply call him a bad architect. But it is certainly an odd example for them to have picked.
In 1943, many people in England still used outside loos and washed in metal baths in front of the kitchen fireplace. And I imagine that this was even more commonplace in Australia and in Ireland when Lewis was growing up. The British government was offering home improvement subsidies to people without bathrooms as late as the 1970s; and comedians of the era were still making jokes about the outside lavatories of their childhood. (And also about the use of repurposed newspapers for toilet paper.) And what does and doesn’t count as “clean” varies across different times and different places: in 21st century England, most people take a shower at least once a day, where Queen Elizabeth I famously took a bath once a month whether she needed it or not. So I suppose that Lewis’s point is that King and Ketley are treating a fairly modern and fairly luxurious innovation as a universal fact; and regarding present-day norms about sweaty smells as a self-evident principle. Perhaps he is also concerned that King and Ketley use “healthy” to mean both “what you are if you learn about other people’s ideas” and “what you are if you take a daily bath”. Cleanliness is a substitute for godliness.
*
In medieval times, there would have been no contradiction in calling someone “a good man and a villain” or “a nice chap and a bastard”: you’d simply have been saying that the one was a morally upright fellow who happened to live in a village, and the other was a likeable chap who’s parents happened not to be married. We could say that words like “villain” and “bastard” used to have referential meaning but are now used primarily for their emotive sense; we might say that they were at one time denotive and are now primarily connotative. CS Lewis, in an essay entitled the Death of Words, says that they are terms of description which have become terms of abuse. They are “words which once had a definable sense and are now mere noises of approval”. He is concerned that the word “Christian” is increasingly used in what he calls a “eulogistic” sense—as a compliment. He wants to use “Christian” to mean “someone who assents to a specific, knowable set of doctrinal beliefs”: other people want to use it to mean “someone who lives up to a particular moral precepts”. “That’s a Christian act” or “He is a good Christian” could end up only meaning that the person or the act was good, or that the speaker approves of them. By the end of the essay, Lewis seems to have gone full Sapir-Whorf. If the word Christian loses its meaning, the concept will be in danger of being “blotted from the human mind….Men do not long continue to think what they have forgotten how to say.”
To prove his point, he gives an example of another word which used to have a clear referential meaning and is now only a useless dylogism.
He makes the same point in the introduction to the 1950 edition of Mere Christianity (which brought together a series of previously published religious booklets, themselves based on radio lectures). He says that some people have complained about his proscriptive use of the word “Christian” on the radio show. He says that people have asked him "May not many a man who cannot believe these doctrines be far more truly a Christian, far closer to the spirit of Christ, than some who do?" He agrees that this is so, but says that using “Christian” to mean “someone close to the spirit of Jesus” renders a perfectly good word hors de combat.
“In calling anyone a Christian they will mean that they think him a good man. But that way of using the word will be no enrichment of the language, for we already have the word good. Meanwhile, the word Christian will have been spoiled for any really useful purpose it might have served.” [Mere Christianity, preface.]
And he gives an example of another word which used to have a specific denotative meaning and is now simply a term of approval.
He makes the same point yet again in his much more academic Studies in Words. Words, he says, can acquire a sort of “halo”: they start out referring to something specific and identifiable; they start to be used mainly to express approval (or disapproval) but with the original meaning still implicit. But eventually, only the emotional meaning is left. “The whole word is haloed, and finally there is nothing but halo. The word is then, for all accurate uses, dead.” [p282]
And he gives an example of a word that has been killed off in this way. It’s the same example he gave in the Verbicide essay, and again in Mere Christianity.
That word is, of course, “gentleman”.
In its original sense, it referred to someone who was gentil; that is, noble. A gentleman had land and a coat of arms and various other feudal technicalities. (I can’t be the only person who used to think that “When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?” was about gender: it’s actually about class. In the garden of Eden, everyone worked for a living and there were no nobles.) But it gradually came to mean “a person who behaves in the way in which a gentleman is supposed to behave” and eventually “any person we approve of”:
They meant well. To be honourable and courteous and brave is of course a far better thing than to have a coat of arms. But it is not the same thing. Worse still, it is not a thing everyone will agree about. To call a man "a gentleman" in this new, refined sense, becomes, in fact, not a way of giving information about him, but a way of praising him: to deny that he is "a gentleman" becomes simply a way of insulting him.
But isn’t this precisely the point that King and Ketley made when they said that “the reference of the word gentleman is very vague”? And didn’t Lewis blame them for having a narrow, provincial view of morality? When Lewis says that “gentleman” is now a useless word, is he debunking the whole idea of honesty and good manners and refraining from playing the banjo? Or is he simply making a point about language?
The essay on verbicide, the introduction to Mere Christianity, and Studies in Words are all published after the Abolition of Man: after Lewis has studied the Control of Language. It is tempting to consider the possibility that the book unconsciously influenced his thinking.
When a word ceases to be a term of description and becomes merely a term of praise, it no longer tells you facts about the object: it only tells you about the speaker’s attitude to that object. (A "nice" meal only means a meal the speaker likes.)
I recently turned 60 (yes, really) and have mutated from a librarian who writes into a more or less full time writer, so if you have been considering lending your support to my writing, now would be a really, really, really lovely time for you to do so.
Sunday, March 22, 2026
Chapter 6: The Importance of Having Bathrooms.
A smug atheist—let’s call him “Richard”—once wrote an article in a newspaper arguing that materialism was a more positive outlook than religion. If there is no afterlife, he said, then you are motivated to make the best possible use of the time you are given on this earth.
The next day, a letter from an equally smug Christian appeared in the newspaper. “Given by whom?” it asked.
The smug Christian had, arguably, caught the smug atheist in a contradiction. And various conclusions could have been drawn. “People sometimes say things they don’t really mean” would have been one. “It is impossible to talk about big questions without drifting into theological language” would have been another.
But I don’t think we could draw the conclusion that the atheist had shown his true colours—revealed what he really meant, or what he really believed. Not, at any rate, without checking it against the rest of his work. If the smug Christian had gone through Richard’s published writings and found that over and over again he talked as if there was one all-powerful Force controlling everything—well, that would be Quite Interesting. But if, having read his book and found that he consistently talked about evolution and physics as if they were blind, impersonal physical processes, it would be fair to assume that that was what he believed. If the smug Christian continued to say “But, of course, we know he really believes in the Force, because he said so” we wouldn’t think he was playing entirely fair.
Throughout the Control of Language, King and Ketley take it for granted that some things are good and some things are bad. But Lewis doesn’t take this as evidence against his thesis that they believe that value-judgements are subjective and unimportant. He simply accuses them of inconsistency. It demonstrates, he says, that they are “better than their principles”.
In an extended footnote [Abolition of Man, page 16] Lewis lists four things King and Ketley seem to approve of, and four things they seem to disapprove of. This, he says, demonstrates:
1: That they do, in fact have values.
2: That these values are the consensus values of those around them.
3: That the consensus values of those around them are contemptible values—at any rate, debased and partial values. (This is, I suppose the “and by the way I personally think those values are false” part of the argument.)
If you have damning evidence against the man in the dock, you don’t tell the jury that he is certainly, definitely, one hundred per cent guilty—and that even if he isn’t, it doesn’t matter, because he is bound to be guilty of something very nearly as bad. I think that Lewis knows that his case is a little weak. Otherwise he would not resort to saying, in effect “King and Ketley do not believe in moral values—and even if they do, the moral values they believe in are the wrong ones.”
Lewis’s complaint is that his adversaries see “comfort and security as the ultimate values” but that “those things which alone can preserve or spiritualise comfort and security are mocked.” But I am afraid that, in each case, Lewis has misunderstood or misrepresented what they actually say.
Lewis’s List of Disapprovals
1: “A mother’s appeal to a child to be brave is ‘nonsense’.”
King and Ketley are talking about propaganda, which they think is a kind of super advertising that utilises stock emotional responses to manipulate the listener. They acknowledge that appeals to emotion may sometimes be useful or necessary: parents often use them to socialise children. But propaganda is on the whole a bad thing precisely because it infantilises adults.
Lewis uses “dulce et decorum est…” as an example of moral belief that civilised people take to be a deep truth even though it could be debunked at a literal level. (Dying isn’t a kind of food and therefore can’t taste sweet, and death in battle is unlikely to be sweet even by analogy.) So until I tracked down a copy of Control of Language, I assumed that “a mother’s appeal to a child to be brave” was referencing a Roman parent sending her son off to fight for the Empire. In fact, it refers to a contemporary mum trying to persuade a toddler to take some medicine.
When a mother wants to get her child to swallow unpleasant medicine, she pours this artificially constructed emotive prose into his ears: “Be Mother’s brave little darling, now,” and so on. This sort of nonsense is often successful, and is a kind of propaganda. [Control of Language p62]
Some of the sounds which adults make to children are literally nonsensical (“Upsy daisy mummy’s ickle diddle diddums” etc etc.) In fact, King and Ketley’s example contains a fair amount of meaningful content:
It is right for a child to seek its mother’s approval
You know that your mother approves of courage
Bigger children with more privileges have courage
It will take courage to swallow this pill
Therefore you ought to put up with the unpleasant taste because it’s what an older child would do, and because it will make your mother proud of you
But it is certainly true that the mother is not giving her real reason for wanting her child to take the medicine. She could perfectly well have done so: “This will taste horrid for a few seconds, but afterwards your hurty tummy will go away.” But she chose to appeal to emotion instead. The analogy with propaganda is perfectly clear. On no possible view are King and Ketley saying that the concept of courage itself is nonsensical.
2: “The reference of the word gentleman is extremely vague”
This follows directly from the previous passage. The parent has used “propaganda” to make the child take the pill, and at school, the child will be subjected to similar “propaganda”. Stock responses to emotive words will be employed to make him do particular things, without giving him any rational grounds for thinking that they are the right things to do.
In school the child will be given, mostly in speech, a good many of these vaguely important words, whose reference is not clearly defined; the word “gentleman,” for instance. The word is supposed to rouse feelings of strong approval in such a sentence as: “That is not the action of a gentleman” though the reference is extremely vague. [p62]
Recall that the reference of “Sir Francis Drake” is “a man in a ruff and a boat who sets fire to Spaniard’s beards” but that the emotive meaning of his name is “freedom and heroism and patriotism”. In the same sense the emotional meaning of “gentleman” is “a person we strongly approve of ", but the reference is—what? A posh chap, as opposed to a working class oik? An immaculately turned out fellow in a pinstripe suit and a monocle? I rather think that if the word is in use at all nowadays, except as a polite euphemism for a men’s public lavatory, it has the connotation of good manners: a gentleman doesn’t cheat at cards, he holds the door open for ladies, and remembers to tip the waiter. King and Ketley are quite correct to say that “Don’t do this because it isn’t what a gentleman would do” says nothing more than “Don’t do this because it isn’t the kind of thing we approve of.” On no view are they saying that honour, good manners, politeness—or even social class—are meaningless or without value.
3: “To call a man a coward really tells us nothing about what he does.”
Lewis’s next example comes from King and Ketley’s critique of a ludicrous piece of war-time propaganda that they have invented in order to show how ludicrous it is. It advocates war against a fictional nation called the Utopians:
The Utopians are a contemptible race of low, cunning people—the dregs of the earth. Vicious, degraded, cowardly, lovers only of themselves and their invariably ill-gotten gold, they are unfit, and will ever be unfit, to mix with the proud splendour of our northern people... [p64]
Lewis seems to think that King and Ketley are skeptical about the virtue of courage—he has, after all, just falsely claimed that they think that injunctions to be brave in general are nonsensical. But their allegation is merely that the term coward, like the term gentleman is an emotive term of approval that hasn’t said anything specific.
To call a man an architect tells us something clear about what he does—he designs and supervises buildings; but to call a man a coward tells us really nothing about what he does. We use the word as a word of disapproval, not as a descriptive term. Before we know whether to call a man a coward, we must find out how he has acted and in what circumstances—and this the word does not tell us. [p64]
If the passage had given us an example of the Utopians' actual behaviour, King and Ketley might well have thought that “coward” was an appropriate description. On no possible view are they saying that no-one is a coward, or that cowardice is not under some circumstances reprehensible.
4: “Feelings about a country or an empire are feelings about nothing in particular.”
This time, King and Ketley’s target is a sentimental piece of writing that calls for Australians to show unswerving love for England.
The relation between England and the Dominions should naturally be the relation between a mother and her children. England is our Mother Country; and we should give her, for her ever-constant, protective love, the respect and affection which is her due. The sacred bond which binds all human families together, for their health and mutual wisdom, should bind our family of nations together… [p76]
Although Lewis doesn’t pick up on this, they do here take the passage to task for being literally untrue: they note that “England is actually not a mother, and the dominions are not her children”. But they are attacking the validity of the comparison, not making a point against metaphor in general. The patriotic screed appears to say “It is right that children love their mothers, therefore, it is right that Australians should love England”—but since the passage hasn’t established in what way England is mother-like, the metaphor doesn’t go anywhere. The accusation is the same as the one Thompson directed at the travel agent: the piece is trying to play the audience like a keyboard, clicking certain words and getting certain reactions in return:
The writer seeks to rouse certain feelings about the Empire, but what that Empire is, what actually are the relations between the Dominions (and colonies) and England, are so vaguely defined or hinted at, that we have nothing real to attach our feelings to. [p78]
Hence
It rouses feeling about nothing in particular; and that is always an insult to the intelligence.
Nothing in particular. They used exactly the same words when they were talking about the silly letter to the newspaper: it wasn’t a complaint about anything in particular. They rewrote it, adding specific details—the new movie house would be noisy, didn’t fit in with the local architecture, would cause traffic congestion, and so on. And they used the same words again with regard to the newspaper report of the riot: the journalist didn’t appear to have noticed anything in particular. They contrasted that with the good war reporter who painted a vivid picture of who specifically was doing what specifically to whom specifically and where specifically they were doing it.
This time, they suggest that imagining England as a father rather than a mother might be more apt; and use the analogy to refer to actual, concrete reasons why Australia might want to seek independence just yet:
Moreover, most of the children, as yet, do not earn enough to keep a sufficiently large body-guard of servants to protect themselves, so that Father feels it necessary to protect them, in return for promises of good behaviour and tokens of practical affection; and this again is a family bond. [p79]
The claim is that the bad piece of patriotic writing is so generalised that the emotions it evokes refer to “nothing in particular”. The omission of the emphasis changes the meaning of the text. On no possible view are they saying that patriotism in general is without meaning.
Unless, unless… Does Lewis think that Australians really should love England with the unquestioning love that a child feels for Mummy, and that to criticise patriotic writing necessarily implies the denial of that objective truth?
[continues]
This is the first section of an ongoing critique of C.S Lewis's book The Abolition of Man. (I think that my essays should make sense if you aren't familiar with that tome.) This first section (which runs to six chapters) has already been published in full on my Patreon page, and the second section is being serialised there at present.
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